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Politics  is the  science  of how who  gets  what,  when and why.  (Sidney
Hillman,  in Political Primer, 1944.)
The  world  is  very  much concerned  about how  who  gets what
food,  when,  and why.
In many foreign  lands,  millions  continue  to  suffer from inade-
quate diets,  and through  modern communications  they realize  that
others  do  not.  In  still other foreign  lands,  such as Poland  and the
USSR,  millions  would like  to add more meat and animal  products
to their diets, and through moder  communications  they know that
others  enjoy  such diets.
Domestically,  millions of us increasingly  realize,  again through
modem  communications,  and  through  price  changes,  that the  in-
comes of American farmers,  the budgets of American consumers,
and subsidies for the U.S. maritime  interests are closely  related to
the  poverty  in  Northeast  Brazil,  drought  in  the  African  Sahel,
decisions  in the  Kremlin,  and empty food bowls  in parts  of Asia.
This heightened  awareness  is  leading  an increasing  number of
Americans  and officials of foreign  governments  to  press for politi-
cal  decisions  regarding  food.  Therefore,  I  have  chosen  to discuss
in  this  paper:  (1)  the  increasing  pressures  for  political  decisions
regarding food, (2)  the context in which these decisions  will have to
be made-great discontinuities  among nations and wide disparities
of wealth and income, and (3)  issues which are especially related to
the prices  and the distribution of food.  The political and economic
response  of the  United  States to the  issues  related to food  prices
and distribution can greatly affect the lives of the poor of the world
and the relationships  among nations.
NEW  PRESSURES  FOR POLITICAL DECISIONS
People and governments  are saying that they are unhappy with
the  prices  and  the  distribution  of food.  Domestically,  U.S.  gov-
ernment agencies  and economic  groups which  heretofore  had paid
little  attention  to  food  policies  are  aggressive  participants  in  the
debate.  International  meetings  about  food  attract  many  partici-
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agriculture  units of government.
Mr.  Meany  and  other spokesmen  for  special  interests  see the
prospective  sale of grain  to the USSR and the  related  public  con-
cerns  as  an  opportunity  to  press  for  increased  government  sub-
sidies for the maritime  industry and to draw attention to the effect
of such  a sale  on the U.S.  cost of living.  Farm organizations  have
established  a "hot line  system"  aimed  at neutralizing the political
influence  of those critical  of the prospective  sales.  Internationally,
the  World  Food  Conference  established  new  institutions  to  give
greater attention  to food  problems  of the developing  countries  and
to  encourage  political  decisions  affecting  the  prices  and  the  dis-
tribution  of food.
Detente with the USSR and the People' s Republic of China has
added another set of political dimensions  to food.  In both countries
government units conduct the international  trade.  Political as  well
as  economic  considerations  undoubtedly  influence  the timing  and
amount of their contracts for food imports and food exports. These
considerations  are  part  of the  total  political  framework  in  which
world  food  problems  must  be examined.
POLITICAL  DECISIONS HAVE  ALWAYS  AFFECTED
FOOD  PRICES  AND DISTRIBUTION
Political  decisions  have  always  affected  domestic  economies
and international  markets.  In  some  cases the effects  are direct,  as
when  governments  buy  and  sell  commodities  and  set  trade  sub-
sidies and tariffs.  In the United States, restraints  on meat imports,
marketing agreements,  and the food stamp program illustrate polit-
ical decisions  affecting  food prices  and  distribution.
Significant  efforts  have  been  made  over the years  to  integrate
politics  with  economics  in  international  food  trade.  The  General
Agreement on Tariffs and Tade (GATT), for example,  has focused
on national trade barriers  and the  overriding influence  of domestic
food  policies  on  international  trade.  The  International  Wheat
Agreement,  while  criticized  in  many  ways,  did  provide  a  "legiti-
mate"  framework  for the United  States  and Canada,  and to  some
extent Australia, to cooperate  in making government decisions  re-
garding international  wheat trade  in  the  1960's.
During  some  periods  in  the  past,  such  as  in  the  mid-1960's,
there has  been increased  concern about world food  problems  with
subsequent  diminishment of these concerns. Thus,  it is reasonable
to ask:  Is the present situation fundamentally different, and will the
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there  is  a greater chance that  it is different and the politicizing will
be more  sustained.
One  reason for this  expectation  is the  prospective  uneasy bal-
ance  between supply  and demand  for food,  even though the crisis
conditions  of recent months  will not continue  on and on,  and per
capita  supplies  of developing  countries  will  resume  an  upward
trend.  But the gains will  be modest, and the masses of low-income
people  in  these  countries  will  experience  only  limited  improve-
ments  in nutrition.  Further,  supplies  in developed  and developing
countries  are bound  to be  affected  both by weather  variation  and
energy  prices  and availabilities.  Levels  of demand  for imports  are
highly uncertain.  The unpredictable  decisions  of countries  such  as
the  USSR and  the  People's  Republic  of China  are  involved.
The  answer also  is associated  with the international  context in
which political  decisions will have to be made-new discontinuities
in the  relationships  among  nations  and  challenges  to  the  situation
whereby  wealth  and  income  overwhelmingly  affect  the  incidence
of hunger in the world. These  factors have the potential to sustain
the current concern for food and make its effect greater than it has
ever been before.
THE SETTING  FOR POLITICAL  DECISIONS
New  Discontinuities  Among  Nations
The recent politicizing of food comes  at a time of great discon-
tinuities in relations among nations. The decisions of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum  Exporting Countries (OPEC) have caused sharp
changes  in the distribution of income among nations.  Detente with
the USSR  and the  People's  Republic  of China  calls  for political,
nonmarket  considerations  by the United  States  in  exporting  food
to these countries.
Intensified  pressure  by  the  low-income  countries  for  better
terms of trade  and distribution of goods,  including food,  are  likely
to continue.  Improved  transportation  and communication  make it
increasingly unlikely that the masses in the lower-income  countries
will  quietly tolerate  a widening gap between the rich and the  poor
countries.  The same may be true of the gaps between the rich and
the  poor within  the low-income  countries.
The  leaders  of the  developing  countries  see  that  the  OPEC,
through political decisions,  is exacting the type of prices that they
desire for other products.  Developing countries take satisfaction  in
the injury  the OPEC is  inflicting  on developed  countries,  even  to
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actions on themselves.  The developing countries essentially  argue
that  the  rich,  through  GATT,  the  Organization  for  Economic
Cooperation and  Development,  the International Monetary Fund,
and  multinational  firms,  have  politically  controlled the economics
among  nations.  Politics  has  been  involved,  but  it  has  been
developed-country  politics.
Effects  of Wealth and Income  on  the  Incidence  of Hunger
One  of the  central  questions  in  the  new  politics  of food  is,
should wealth and income continue to have an overwhelming effect
on the distribution of food  and, therefore,  the incidence of hunger
in  the world?
Today,  people  in  the  developing  nations,  which  include  two-
thirds of the world's population,  eat only one-fourth  of the world's
protein,  and most of that is in the form of cereals.  In countries such
as India,  people consume less than 400 pounds of cereals per capita
each  year.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  developed  countries,  large
quantities  of cereals  are  converted  to protein.  Annual  per capita
grain  consumption  is  1,435  pounds  in  the  USSR,  about  1,800
pounds  in  West  Germany  and  France,  and  1,850  pounds  in  the
United States. The billion people in the rich nations,  with tastes for
livestock products,  use practically as much cereal as livestock feed
as  the two billion people  in the low-income  nations  use directly as
food.
While population growth has obviously  been a significant factor
in  increasing  world food demand,  even more  striking has been the
sharp  recent  increase  in  cereal  consumption  per  capita  in  de-
veloped  countries  where  populations  have  not  been  growing
rapidly.  In  the eight-year  period,  1964-66  to  1972-74,  per capita
consumption  of cereal  grains  increased  by  250 pounds,  or  16  per-
cent,  in the United  States and by 330 pounds, or 30 percent,  in the
USSR.  These  gains  were  more  than  half the  1972-74  total  con-
sumption of 395  pounds  per capita  in the developing countries.
The  USSR's  decision  to  protect  diets  was  felt  worldwide  by
both rich and poor. When the Soviets purchased almost one-fifth of
the  total  U.S.  wheat  supply  in  the  1972-73  crop  year,  supplies
normally  available  to others dropped  sharply.  Nations and people
reacted by bidding  up the price  of the  remaining wheat,  the more
aggressively  because  the  currencies  of Japan  and  several  other
commercial  importers of U.S.  foodstuffs were worth substantially
more  in terms of dollars  as  a result of successive  devaluations.
80In  contrast,  the  limited  wealth  and  low  income  of the  poor
countries  again  determined  how  well  they could  compete  in  food
purchasing.  So  long  as  total  cereal  production  is  responsive  to
needs,  effects on the poor are minimal,  especially over time.  But  in
times  of sharply  increased  demand  or curtailed  supplies,  the  im-
pacts  can  be  harsh.  For example,  the  1972-73  Indian  food  grain
crop dropped  from  105 million to 96  million tons.  In the tug of war
between  maintaining diets  and  saving foreign  exchange,  diets  lost
and food prices were allowed to increase.  In some areas,  food grain
rations  were cut in half in fair-price food shops,  which  serve many
of  the  lowest-income  Indians.  Per  capita  calorie  availability
dropped  toward  the critical levels  of the mid-1960's.
Thus,  in  a world  with great  wealth and  affluence  among only
one-third  of its  population,  the 2,300-year-old  words of the  Greek
cynic,  Diogenes,  come  back  to  haunt  us.  When  asked  for  the
proper time to eat, he responded,  "If a rich man, when you will;  if
a poor  man, when  you  can."
But it  is important to distinguish  between the short run and the
long  run.  In the  short  run,  the world  is dealing  with food already
produced  or  about  to  be  produced.  The  distribution  of income
among rich and poor  is then a primary determinant  of the distribu-
tion  of the food.  In the  long  run,  producers  respond  to demands
flowing  from  incomes.  Thus,  the  low  incomes  of the  developing
countries  have  been a  primary  determinant  of the  low food  con-
sumption  levels  of these  countries,  but  the  high  incomes  of the
developed  countries  have  not.
FOOD PRICE,  PRODUCTION,  AND DISTRIBUTION  ISSUES
Of the many  food  issues  demanding  attention,  I will focus  on
these  four:  instability  of prices,  rules of the  game for trade,  food
aid,  and  low productivity  in the  developing  countries.
Instability of Cereal Prices
By maintaining large  grain  stockpiles,  the United  States  has in
past years  been able  to moderate  price  swings-nationally and in-
ternationally.  The  availability  of  U.S.  stocks  dampened  price
changes  in the international market while discouraging  increases  in
domestic  prices.  In  times  of general  surplus,  the  United  States
chose to  stockpile grain  and withhold  land from  production  rather
than  accept lower domestic  prices or pay larger export  subsidies.
This  situation has completely changed.  Stocks held by the gov-
ernment  have  been eliminated,  and land once  held out of produc-
tion has been freed for production.  In general, any amounts of food
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the United States (with exceptions  such as the export limitation on
soybeans and  oilseeds  during July-September  1973,  last fall's cut-
back  on  USSR  purchases,  prior  approval  requirements  for large
sales,  and the present  hold  on sales to  the  USSR).
U.S.  farm  prices  are  influenced  by international  markets,  and
vice versa.  In the absence of U.S. government stocks, and with the
domestic  U.S.  market  and  the  international  market  moving  to-
gether,  food  prices  will  be  unstable.  And  this  instability  will  in-
crease as weather conditions  around the world change from year to
year, producing  changes  in import needs  and export  supplies.
In  the  face  of this  price  instability,  several  different  types  of
adjustments  may  be  made.  First,  adjustments  may  occur  in  the
feed-livestock  sector. The United  States has recently  experienced
sharply higher feed costs and,  in turn, a sharply reduced consump-
tion of cereals  as  feed.  As  shown  in Figure  1, adjustment in  feed
grain consumption is  in marked contrast to the increased consump-
tion of cereals  in the USSR.
Second, various export control devices  may be used to stabilize
domestic  U.S.  prices.  The  state-trading  nations  and  some  other
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FIGURE  1
82developed countries  can control exports  and insulate their domes-
tic price  structure  from international  price changes.  The Canadian
Wheat Board, for example,  decides whether to offer wheat for sale
and  at  what  price.  Contracts  are  not  made  unless  supplies  are
estimated to  be clearly  available.
One  of the  outstanding  political  issues  is,  should  the  United
States  establish export controls, taxes, or subsidies?  It is important
to recognize  that although export taxes  have  been commonly  em-
ployed by other countries to insulate  domestic  prices by reserving
supplies  for domestic  consumption,  the  U.S.  constitution  appar-
ently  forbids  such taxes.  However,  for  a brief period  during  the
1960's,  techniques  were  devised whereby  wheat  exporters  on oc-
casion  "paid"  the  U.S.  government  specified  amounts,  under  a
balancing  arrangement.  On  other  occasions,  when  U.S.  prices
were  higher than international  prices,  the exporters  "received"  a
payment.
In a real  sense  the United States already has  a form of export
licensing  for  part  of our exports.  For  shipments  of food  under
Public  Law 480, the country desiring commodities  approaches  the
U.S. government.  The government,  considering  U.S. market  con-
ditions  and  the  credit  needs  of the  applying  country,  decides  on
the  amount to  be  financed  by  P.L.  480 funds.  This  agreement  is
made  public,  and  the recipient  government  proceeds  to deal  with
the private trade in making the purchase.  If such an approach were
expanded  to  commercial  sales,  the  review  process  in  the  U.S.
government  could  be focused  primarily on  supply availability.
Third, adjustment to price  instability may also take the form of
establishing  food  reserve  stocks  nationally,  by  importers  or  ex-
porters  or  both,  or  conceivably  on  an  international  basis.  The
mechanics and policy framework for acquiring and managing these
stocks  are  not  easily  established,  due  to  the  multiple  and  some-
times  conflicting  objectives  of a  stocks  program.  Such  programs
can  operate  in  a  host  of ways:  They  can  stabilize  prices  or,  by
withdrawing supplies,  actually increase  prices; they can be used to
stimulate  production,  or as  a  set-aside  to  meet  acute  shortages
(which,  however,  reduces  their  usefulness  in  stabilizing  prices);
they  may  or  may  not  be  earmarked  especially  for  lower-income
countries.
There are other questions,  such as, where should stocks be held
and by whom?  Stocks need to be distributed throughout the  world
to  avoid overdependence  on  a small number of countries  in times
of  shortage.  U.S.  stocks  alone  are  not  an  adequate  answer.
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ate,  as  in the  past,  to lull others into  believing  that they need  not
build their own  reserves.
An  especially crucial  question for the United  States  is,  should
we depend  on private trade or the government to carry the stocks?
The private trade will limit the stocks they carry if large  stocks are
carried  by the U.S. government.  How much they will accumulate
and carry if the government does not have any stocks is not known.
Serious  consideration  needs  to be given  to ways  to encourage  the
carrying  of stocks  by private  trade.
Costs of stocks  also argue that not just major exporters should
be  involved in  a food  reserve scheme.  Food  stocks are  expensive
to purchase initially,  and they are costly to store.  Rough estimates
of monthly costs of storing grain stocks in the United States  are 60
cents per ton, exclusive of interest costs of money invested  in the
commodities or any allowance for physical deterioration  or losses.
If interest costs  are added-at 8 percent on an assumed value of 75
percent  of the  current  U.S.  market  prices  for  grain-the  annual
carrying  cost of one  ton of wheat  would  be  $21,  or for one ton of
corn,  $14.
Estimates of the amount of stocks  "needed"  vary and depend
on  objectives.  One  way  to  estimate  the  need  is  to  consider  the
fluctuation  of production  in  past  years.  Based  on  1960-73  world
production  changes,  25 to 40 million tons of grain would be needed
to  meet two-thirds of the annual  shortfalls.
For the United States there are important trade-offs.  As long as
the  U.S.  balance  of payments  is  in  doubt,  the  benefit  from  high
export sales of agricultural products  is bound  to weigh heavily.  On
the other hand, over time exports  would be expanded  if supplies to
foreign customers  could be assured from year to year at relatively
stable  prices.  For dependability,  an exporter of farm commodities
may need not only supplies  for which  importers can  bid but avail-
able  supplies  at relatively  stable  prices.
Unstable  food  prices  are  of concern  to  consumers  and  labor
unions.  Farm  interests,  too,  may  become  frustrated  with  the  ef-
fects  of  instability.  Major  groups  of  American  farmers  have
benefited  from high  prices; for others the  benefits  have been more
limited or none at all.  For example,  net farm income in New York
and  Pennsylvania  in  1974  was  up  25  percent  from  the  1969-71
average.  But  in  Iowa,  Illinois,  and  Indiana,  it  was double.
Eventually,  U.S.  interests  may  dovetail  with  an  international
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U.S.  farm  producers  as  a  whole  would  prefer  cattle  prices  that
stabilize close to $40 rather than $55 cattle one year and $30 cattle
another.  International discussions  continue,  but ways  to  stabilize
prices,  such  as  stocking  programs,  are  not  likely to  be developed
until the degree  of instability is known and the effects of instability
felt.
Rules  of the  Game  for International Trade in  Food
GATT  was  designed  to  bring  about  progressive  liberalization
of trade-including  agricultural  trade-especially  among Western
Europe,  North  America,  and  Japan.  The  results  for  agricultural
trade  have been  limited.  The  European  Community is  highly pro-
tected  with  a  variable  levy  system  on  most agricultural  imports.
Japan retains  significant control on imports  and high internal  food
prices.  However,  since their food needs exceed  their food produc-
tion,  their imports  have  expanded,  and the  United  States  has  ad-
justed its  commodity programs  to permit a close  interfacing of the
international  and  domestic  markets.  But these  adjustments  have
come  largely as  a result of U.S.  objectives  rather than from part-
nership  in reordering  economic  relations.
The  role of developing  countries  in  GATT has  been  severely
limited.  Further,  we  have  avoided  dealing  with  a  wide  range  of
trade matters in other forums where developing countries are more
prominent.  Mr.  Kissinger's  suggestions  to  the  United  Nations
would seem to call for a  significant departure from this approach.
But the  most crucial problems  of international  trade in  agricul-
tural  products  relate  to  trade  with  the  USSR  and  other  state-
controlled economies.  These problems  are especially  acute for the
United  States  because  of our dominance  as  an  exporter.  But  all
countries  have  a  stake  in  them  since  they  affect commercial  and
noncommercial  supplies  and prices  to other  importing countries.
When  the  United  States  made  export  payments  and  had  sub-
stantial  stocks of wheat,  international  prices  and shares  of export
markets  among suppliers  such  as  the United  States,  Canada,  and
Australia  reflected  those  known  political  and  economic  facts.  In
contrast,  information  about  Soviet  crop  conditions,  government
budgets,  political  directions,  and  other  relevant  factors  is  ex-
tremely  limited.  The  recent  agricultural  agreement  between  the
USSR and the United States  calls for exchange  of information  on
crop  conditions  and  forward  estimates  of  crop  production  and
trade.  However,  these provisions  have not been  fulfilled.
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lated.  Only  one-third  of Soviet  agricultural  land  lies  south of the
49th  parallel  and only  1 percent of it  lies  in  areas  with  an annual
rainfall of 28 inches  or more.  In contrast,  almost all of the United
States  lies  below  the  48th  parallel,  and  60  percent of U.S.  arable
land receives  at least  28 inches of rainfall annually.  Little wonder,
then,  that  frequent  and wide  changes  occur in  Soviet  cereal  pro-
duction.  Figure 2 shows  an impressive  upward  trend of 3 percent
annual  growth  since  1960,  but  it  is  like the  teeth of a jagged saw,
with large  fluctuations  almost annually.
In spite  of these  long-term  increases  of production,  the USSR
has  pushed livestock production  so that only in years of outstand-
ing cereal  production  are there supplies  adequate  without imports.
In years  of poor harvest,  such as  1975,  large  imports are  required
to avoid extensive  livestock  liquidations.
The  problem  is  broader  than  trade  with  the  USSR.  In  the
1973-74 crop year, the People's  Republic of China became a much
larger buyer of grain, with purchases totaling probably more than 9
million  tons,  a  50  percent  increase  over  recent  import  levels.
Moreover,  China  switched  heavily  to  the  U.S.  market,  taking  7
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Imillion  tons  of the total  here  and becoming the  prime U.S.  wheat
customer  for this  period.  And this  after  a  year when  weather  in
China was generally good, with no sign of catastrophes.  We simply
do not know either the present guidelines for Chinese purchases or
the  true  state of Chinese  stocks.
The  Japanese  government  and  Japanese  importing  interests
work together  closely.  In  1973  Japanese  concerns purchased  rela-
tively large amounts of cotton and shrimp,  sharply raising prices  in
both  markets  as  private  U.S.  traders  attempted  to  buy  from  re-
maining supplies. The Japanese purchases  of grain have been more
stable,  however,  and Japan has been  willing to indicate  its import
needs  at an early  stage.
There  is an urgent need to develop understanding of "the rules
of the  game"  with  large  countries-especially  those  dealing  as
monopolies  or near monopolies.  As  a minimum,  the U.S.  govern-
ment and the public must have information  on developments  within
these countries.  Information  on weather,  agricultural  production,
stocks,  and  prices  would appear  to be essential  if these  countries
are  to  have  access  to  our  markets.  However,  information  alone
would  not automatically  prevent  wide  swings  in U.S.  prices.  To
permit  any  large  country  to  make  purchases  of any  size  in  U.S.
grain  markets  subjects  the  U.S.  market  to  possible  wide  fluc-
tuations in purchases amounting to possible  manipulation  by politi-
cal leaders of other countries.
Perhaps  bilateral  deals  and  understandings  are  not  the  long-
term answer to this problem, but for the time being they are essen-
tial.  In the Soviet case, for example,  should not sales of U.S. grain
be  part of a  larger  arrangement  involving  U.S.  imports  of Soviet
products?  One  possibility  would  be  petroleum  products.  Should
not  the  arrangement  also  provide  for  maximum  and  minimum
purchases  to  permit  sharing  by  both  the  USSR  and  the  United
States in adjustments to possible  shortfalls  in Soviet production  as
well  as  shortfalls  in U.S.  production?  In  any case,  the traditional
"rules of the game"  are now unacceptable  politically  and econom-
ically to many people and governments.  New rules will have to be
instituted.
Food  Aid
The  developing  countries  would  benefit  enormously  from
measures  to  limit  the  fluctuation  in  world  food  prices  and  from
greater  stability  of USSR  activity  in  international  food  markets.
Regardless, the crucial question is whether other nations,  including
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tries  attain  at least minimum essential  levels of food.
Recent  upward  pressure  on  prices  and  the  potential  to  export
all available  cereals in excess of U.S. domestic needs have brought
significant changes  in P.L. 480 programs.  In  1974 the quantities of
food aid dropped  significantly.  Because  of higher prices,  the drop
in value was much less.  Quantities  in fiscal  year  1975  were higher,
but  still significantly  less than in earlier years.
The  reduction  of international  food  sharing contrasts  sharply
with  domestic  food  sharing.  The  food  programs-child  nutrition,
special  milk,  and  food  stamp  programs-were  proposed  in  the
January  1975  Budget Message of the President at a record level and
represent  almost  three-fourths  of the  Department's  budget.
P.L.  480  has  been  a  program  for  U.S.  agriculture.  For  many
years,  P.L. 480 programs  were consistent with commercial  objec-
tives  for  agricultural  exports.  They  permitted  us  to  charge  lower
prices  to  poor  countries  without  undercutting  our  prices  to  the
richer  countries.  Through  adjusting terms-use  of the  local  cur-
rency,  credit,  and commercial sales-effective prices were tailored
to  the customer's  financial  and security  status.
With strong demand,  negligible stocks, and high prices,  it is not
now advantageous  to move significant  amounts of food  under P.L.
480.  Therefore,  political  support  for  food  aid  has  waned  some-
what,  although  new  efforts  are  under way  in  the Congress to  put
new  life  into  the  program.  But considering  the  large  and growing
import bill for petroleum  supplies and the potential  of commerical
agricultural  exports  to  ease  the  burden  of that  bill,  concessional
sales or grants in a U.S. food aid program will probably not provide
the volumes  that they have  in the past. The significant food  gap in
the developing countries remains to be filled by some other means.
The  world  and  the  United  States  will  need  to  evaluate  trade-
offs  between  food  aid  and  other  economic  assistance.  Most  de-
veloped  countries  and  international  assistance  agencies  have  lim-
ited but  significant resources  for assisting lower-income  countries.
Hitherto, they have never had to closely evaluate trade-offs.  In the
United States,  such consideration  could  be avoided  since  the  ap-
propriations  flowed from different congressional committees  to dif-
ferent executive departments.  P.L. 480 as an agricultural  program
pre-empted  and  relieved  economic  assistance  agencies  like  the
U.S.  Agency for International  Development and the International
Bank for  Reconstruction  and Development.  The international  as-
sistance agencies  did not pick up food aid simply because it was  in
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assistance as a major adjunct to U.S. agricultural  programs.  It was
mutually advantageous  to  have this  division.  Resources  for inter-
national assistance could be used for items other than food, and the
Department of Agriculture  could  carry the cost of food  aid.
It is time  for international  agencies  such  as the  World  Bank to
ask,  should  not  food  aid  be  made  an  integral  part  of economic
assistance  programs?  And,  it  is  time  for the  lower-income  coun-
tries to ask,  should we use aid proceeds  to buy turbines or to buy
grain in  times  of food  shortages?
Food assistance can be a form of investment.  As with P.L. 480,
the proceeds from the sale of food provided on a concessional  basis
can  be  used  for  investment  in  irrigation  facilities,  locally  made
machines,  and production facilities-much  as hard-currency  loans
can be used to  provide  foreign-made  machines,  and  perhaps  with
greater employment  and productivity  effects.  These  choices  have
not  been  faced  simply  because,  through  P.L.  480,  food  was
"priced"  low,  and  the  money,  once  appropriated  for  food  aid,
could  not  be  switched  to  other  assistance  activities.  Now  the
higher  prices  will  require  more difficult  and  complex choices.
Low  Productivity  in the Developing  Countries
The World Food Conference correctly emphasized the need for
increased  food  production  in  the  developing  countries.  This  is
especially  important  when  one  considers  the  significance  of  in-
creased production in these countries to employment opportunities
and  economic  growth  and  the  relation  between  socio-economic
conditions  and  population  growth  rates.  Some  of  the  issues  in-
volved  relate  directly  to  policies  of  the  developing  countries.
Others relate  more  to  the policies  of the  United  States and  other
developed  countries.  One  of  these  concerns  U.S.  universities.
What should be the role of the U.S.  agricultural  scientific commu-
nity  in  improving  the  productivity  of agriculture  throughout  the
world?
U.S.  universities,  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,  and
private  industry  have  contributed  importantly  to the productivity
of agriculture  in  the  United  States  and  in  other  countries.  The
widely  acclaimed  international  research  centers  have  been  staffed
almost  exclusively  by  U.S.-trained  personnel.  Further,  the  U.S.
agricultural community has generated much of the basic knowledge
on which these centers  and other research  organizations  rely.
Significant  changes  have  occurred  which  call  for  a  re-
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U.S.  universities  in the  emerging international  network of agricul-
tural  research.  These  changed  conditions  include:
1. A greater recognition by the lower-income  countries, as well
as  the  United  States,  of the  importance  of improving  food
production  in  the lower-income  countries.
2.  A  greater  recognition  of the  role  of technology  in  increas-
ing  food production.
3.  An expanded role of international  research institutes in con-
tributing to  the  world  agricultural  scientific  know-how  and
technology.
4.  Aggressive efforts by the OPEC to enhance the productivity
of its agricultural sectors and related requests for substantial
technical  cooperation.
We must become involved on a much greater  scale.  Because of
our size  and expertise,  I expect a continual heavy  demand  on the
U.S. agricultural  scientific community for participating  in technical
cooperation  programs.  Responding  to  these  demands  without  in-
creasing  our capacity to respond  could mean  that we  would drain
the  reservoir of our  technical expertise  and be  unable to  meet the
greatest  needs,  namely,  in  the  poorest countries.
Another change  is  the important  research  being conducted  in
other  countries.  U.S.  science  can benefit  increasingly  from being
involved  with scientists  in other countries on  a professional  basis.
In my judgment,  greater  involvement  of the  U.S.  scientific  com-
munity calls for new organizational  arrangements  and adjustments
in  the  way  we  do  business.  For  example,  for  the  universities  to
cope effectively  with the questions of coordination and policy,  they
need  a  Washington,  D.C.,  staff  to  deal  with  these  international
problems  on a day-to-day  basis.  The recently  established  Interna-
tional  Science  and  Education  Council  links  the  Department  and
the universities  together on broad  policy questions,  but  it will not
be fully effective  without  important  university  staff input.
The funds for international  agricultural  research  and education
should  be  increased  by  large  amounts.  In  using  these  funds,  we
need  to  move  toward  decentralized  decision  making.  Automatic
allocation  of a significant proportion  of such funds to U.S.  univer-
sities would  be  an important  step in  this  direction.  While  current
legislative  proposals  would  enhance the role  of the universities  in
international  development  work by  providing  them with  more re-
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sion  making.
CONCLUSION
In  closing,  significant  progress  has been  made  in dealing  with
world food  problems.  There  is  nonetheless  a  new  politicizing  of
food that is putting new policy issues on the agendas of the Ameri-
can public, the U.S. government, foreign goverments,  and interna-
tional organizations.  The eventual political decisions on these and
other issues  will determine not only how well  the world is fed but
also  future  relationships  among nations.
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